Basically, 'general principles' can be regarded either as a descriptive or a prescriptive concept. From the descriptive perspective, they are abstractions from norms, belonging to legal meta-language, helpful in understanding the (international) legal system or parts of it. From the prescriptive perspective, they are norms, belonging to legal language, hopefully facilitating a holistic interpretation of the (international) legal system in a unitary way. 4 Our logic completely aligns itself with the conception of law as 'ontological normative science', the premises of which draw especially from H. Kelsen, H. L. A. Hart and N. Bobbio: 5 legal reflection is speculation on norms, so normative meta-language. Thus, it is submitted that general principles, instead of being inconsistent abstractions, are norms 6 and the aim is to study rules belonging to the international legal order characterized by the attribute of generality. In fact, I refer indiscriminately to 'general principles' or 'general norms' of (international) law and my reflection is meta-language on the general norms of (international) law.
In the general theory of law, the norm (from the Greek 'nomos': 'rule') is quite unanimously qualified as a prescriptive proposition, because it sets a duty. 7 Actually, although a rule can exist even in the absence of words (we can think, for instance, of the signs belonging to the rules of the road or figure out, more simply, an imperative expressed by simple gestures), 8 the norm can always be enunciated through words. Thus, the normative proposition becomes the certain anchorage for the lawyer's thinking, the fundamental unit of his reasoning. 9 In this regard, it should be noted that the norm, being prescriptive, entails the idea of the right-duty relation, in whatever way it is expressed. Hence, we must reflect on the term 'right': although words cannot exhaust the essence of things, they reveal a more or less complete part of them.
The term 'right' ('Recht', 'droit', 'diritto', 'derecho') comes from low Latin 'directum', past participle of the verb 'dirigere' ('to line up', 'to trace a certain direction', hence 'to set out, to set in order, to regulate, to rule'), which means what is in straight line, i.e. the contrary of what is tortuous. We spontaneously ascribe this feature to the ruler, used to trace straight lines, so that one can figure out formally the idea of the right-duty relation as a link among subjects. 10 Although the norm entails the concept of the right-duty relation, it does not correspond entirely with it, being also something more. In particular, it is necessary to introduce two other elements to comprehend the norm, namely subjects and behaviour (action/inaction), 11 consubstantial with the concept of right, which can be defined as the rule, or measure, of interpersonal behaviour: it is necessary to behave 'rightly', i.e. normally.
From the analytical viewpoint, 12 I divide up synthetically the norm into three basic elements (right-duty relation (1), behaviour (2), subjects (3), and I think of the norm as a right-duty relation that regulates behaviour (action/inaction) among subjects. Hence, law (as the sum of rights) traces an ideal line among subjects that defines their behaviour as exactly as possible.
Lastly, norms are valid in space (4) and time (5), the conception of which is linear in law: these two other elements are the limits of the normative effectiveness. 13 
Therefore, I think synthetically of the norm as a right-duty relation (1) that regulates behaviour (action/inaction) (2) among subjects (3) in definite space (4) and time (5).
Consequently, I conceive of the norm on the basis of five simple elements (necessary and sufficient conditions), through which I pass from the language of words into a language of forms. In this sense I can assert that the logic of law, or normative logic, is a formal logic:
14 law is form.
As N. Bobbio correctly asserted, the logic is formal simply because it concerns the structure of the norm, which is universal and permanent. 15 Hence, I see in the formal sense not only Hartian 'secondary' norms (norms of production), but also 'primary' norms (norms of regulation). To some extent, from this perspective it is possible to reconcile the normative conception of law, of which the most important exponent is H. Kelsen, with the institutional theory, reducing to the norm the institutional aspect, especially the subjective one, prevailing for S. Romano. 16 
Right, duty, claim, obligation
Having schematically defined what a norm is for me, it is now necessary to specify its essential constitutional elements, especially considering the number of subjects to whom the norm is addressed. Indeed, it is possible that a norm regulates a right-duty 11 See M. Virally, La pensée juridique (1960), at 47-49. 12 The analytical approach to law seeks to 'guardar dentro le macchine del diritto e della cultura giuridica, riconoscerne i pezzi, smontarli e rimontarli, disegnarne i modelli e determinarne le relazioni' (U. Scarpelli, 'Filosofia e diritto', in La cultura filosofica italiana dal 1945 al 1980 nella sue relazioni con altri campi del sapere (1981), at 177), and thus 'penetra nell'intimo del diritto, ne scruta le strutture logiche e la forme espressive', making possible 'un dialogo dei filosofi coi giuristi' (U. Scarpelli, 'Prefazione', in U. Scarpelli, C. Luzzati, Compendio di filosofia del diritto, at X). 13 See H. Kelsen, General Theory of Norms (1979) , tr. by M Hartney (1996) , at 144-146, § 36. 14 In this sense see E. di Robilant, 'Realtà e figure nella scienza giuridica', in U. Scarpelli H. Kelsen, a very clear author, finds and distinguishes six fundamental correlative concepts, by reason of the number of the addressees of the norm, i.e. the absolute right, the relative right, the absolute duty, the relative duty, the absolute obligation, and the relative obligation. According to Kelsen, the right is relative when it links a person to a determinate person or a determinate number of persons, whereas it is absolute when it links a person to an indeterminate number of persons or to all the persons of a particular legal order. Symmetrically, the duty and the obligation, identical concepts for Kelsen, are relative when they link a subject to a determinate subject or a determinate number of subjects, whereas they are absolute when they link a subject to an indeterminate number of subjects or to all the subjects of a given legal order.
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Following this approach, the literature employs the concepts of right, duty, claim and obligation alternatively, especially in the domain of international law. Thus, dealing with the relational aspect of law, the correspondence between the notions of right and claim, on one side, duty and obligation, on the other, is highlighted. 20 Sharing the essence of the Kelsenite view on this point and following the common approach of the literature, I employ the concepts of right, duty, claim and obligation alternately in the relative and absolute sense. Nevertheless, I point out that in legal language the terms 'right' and 'duty' are more commonly used in the absolute sense, whereas 'claim' and 'obligation' are more commonly employed in the relative sense, and I think that a constant distinction between relative and absolute concepts would lead to a clearer comprehension of legal situations. 21 The literature dwells on the notion of subjective right, correctly conceived of as a prerogative of the right-holder protected by law, endowing him with the faculty of reaction in case of breach.
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Therefore, I can outline this pattern: an absolute right-duty relation binds a subject towards all the other subjects of a specific legal order and is composed of an ensemble of claim-obligation relations.
23
In other words, it is argued that the absolute right is composed of the ensemble of the claims, having a determinate content, that a subject holds towards all the other subjects of a given legal order, 17 I intend 'claim' in a purely substantive sense. 18 whereas the absolute duty is composed of the ensemble of the obligations, having a determinate content, that a subject holds towards all the other subjects of a given legal order.
It can be concluded that the foundation, i.e. the basic unit (principle), of every legal construction, is the right-duty relation or claim-obligation relation, concepts that can be understood in the relative or absolute sense. 24 Therefore, I specify that a norm is a rightduty (or claim-obligation) relation (1) that regulates behaviour (action/inaction) (2) among subjects (3) in definite space (4) and time (5).
The legal order as a normative system
Norms do not exist alone except for in two imaginary legal orders: the one where all is permitted and the one where all is prohibited (necessarily contradictory?). These two systems, which can be defined as 'mono-normative', are placed at the opposite extremities of a spectrum where several norms, the number of which can be comprised between two and infinity, compose each other. When several norms relate to each other, a normative system comes into being, and we pass from the study of the norm as the basic unit of the legal logic to the analysis of the ensembles into which norms gather. 25 The ascertainment that norms can compose each other systematically supposes that they entertain reciprocal relations, constituting an ordered, i.e. not thoroughly chaotic, totality. From the analytical viewpoint, given that the norm is conceived of as a claimobligation relation that regulates behaviour (action/inaction) among subjects, consequently a normative system consists of an ordered ensemble of claim-obligation relations that regulate behaviour (action/inaction) among subjects in determinate space and time. In this sense I can say that the ensemble of the claim-obligation relations (1) that regulate behaviour (action/inaction) (2) among all the subjects (3) in a definite space (4) and time (5) constitutes the juridical (legal) order, i.e. law, in the objective sense, as an ensemble of (subjective) rights. In fact, this ensemble (juridical cosmos) is called 'objective right' (law), in order to distinguish it from the 'subjective right' as an individual position. 26 Therefore, I formally conceive of not only the norm but also law as a whole on the basis of five simple elements (necessary and sufficient conditions).
The linear view of time generates the concept of procedure, which I define as an ensemble of behaviour (active/inactive conducts) performed in a specific interval of time, regulated by and, eventually, regulating legal relations. Hence, it is also possible to conceive of the legal order (law) as a procedural system. The basic horizontal criterion to relate norms is the principle of imputation, according to which a norm prescribing a duty always entails a norm establishing another duty sanctioning the violation of the primary duty. Actually, this principle expresses the idea 24 According to R. Drago, 'La notion d'obligation: droit public et droit privé', at 44, the notion of obligation 'occupe les tréfonds de la théorie juridique' in public as well as in private law, so it simply constitutes the foundation of law. 25 See N. Bobbio, Teoria dell'ordinamento giuridico (1960), at 3. 26 On the distinction between the subjective and objective right see R. Ago, Addendum to the Eight Report on State Responsibility, YBILC (1980-II-1), at 18, § 9; J. Salmon, Dictionnaire de droit international public, Droit au sens objectif, at 367-368.
that the logical form of the norm is necessarily hypothetical: 'If a, b ought to be'.
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In this pattern, a is the violation of a right-duty relation, whereas b is the right-duty relation sanctioning the violation: 28 the conditional conception of the legal norm simply means that the violation of a duty entails the imposition of a duty by way of sanction. Moreover, only because of the transgression one can better become aware of the existence of a logically prior measure, so much so that Heraclites asserted: 'Men would not have known the name of justice [from Latin 'ius', 'iustum', i.e. 'rectum', 'straight', 'right'] if these things [-instances of injustice -] had not occurred'.
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The principle of imputation is a procedural, and thus dynamic, concept.
The basic vertical principle to order norms is hierarchy: norms are connected to each other in a relationship from superior to inferior, according to a static or dynamic criterion. The static criterion, derived from naturalism and taken to its furthest limit by G. W. von Leibniz, provides that norms are naturally ranged following the pattern superior-inferior, so that a legal system could be regarded as a more geometrico demonstrandum model, where rules would derive from one another by reason of their content. 30 Instead, the dynamic criterion, derived from positivism and taken to its furthest limit by H. Kelsen, provides that norms are ranged following the pattern superior-inferior by reason of the acts-sources, so that the exercise of power would be the decisive element to shape the legal order as a normative pyramid.
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Conceived of in the dynamic sense, hierarchy is a procedural concept. However, these two criteria are not necessarily conflicting: if the act-source remains the fundamental principle for the vertical organization of legal orders, yet other hierarchically ordered norms can statically derive from such set rules.
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On the basis of the compound criteria, norms can be distinguished from each other and ranged in different categories. The most common classification relies on the distinction between primary and secondary norms. As N. Bobbio clearly demonstrated, this categorization can assume different meanings, 33 especially following the principle of imputation and hierarchy. According to H. Kelsen and most of the literature, by reason of the horizontal criterion consisting in the principle of imputation, primary norms simply regulate obligations, whereas secondary norms regulate sanctions in the case of a breach of primary obligations.
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Since the principle of imputation expresses nothing else than the hypothetical logical form of the norm, it is possible to bring primary norms into 27 This less common interpretation can be useful to define the concept of power in the normative sense.
In principle, although the different existing categories of norms can prove useful tools for legal logic, it is always better to keep the analysis simple where possible. 36 Thus, even in differentiation, we should recall that the elementary concepts (subject, relation, behaviour) inhere without exception in all legal norms and constitute its constant formal pattern. The distinguishing criteria, multipliable to infinity, can always be brought back to the essential elements, so to the hypothetical pattern: 'If a, b ought to be'. This simplification in thinking allows us to achieve a unitary representation of the legal matter. Particularly, in the theory of H. Hart the concept of power is the basic principle justifying secondary norms, but it can be reabsorbed, as in the theory of H. Kelsen, in that of faculty, and the latter can be regarded as 'a right to act upon rights'. Although the Kelsenite solution is probably less elegant than the Hartian one, it is conceptually more economic, so simpler.
Normative general principles in international law
Having briefly explained my perception of some fundamental concepts necessary to define and understand law synthetically, I can apply them to general principles in international law.
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At least after the signature of the 1648 Westphalian Treaty, from the subjective viewpoint it became indispensable to grasp the notion of state in order to define international law. Actually, the state subject is a legal person endowed with peculiar features, especially because of the sovereign power, introducing a break in the continuity, i.e. the difference between internal and external law, giving rise to modern international law. I think of the state as an ensemble of subjects linked by claimobligation relations regulating behaviour (action/inaction) in definite space and time, so as a particular normative order. Therefore, I can define international law as the whole claim-obligation relations regulating behaviour (action/inaction) among legal state orders and subjects belonging to different state orders.
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This is a broad outlook, especially from the subjective viewpoint, resuming the idea of 'ius gentium' proposed by G. Scelle.
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General principles constitute a particular category in the domain of international legal relations. Assuming that the concept of obligation is the principle, i.e. the fundamental 35 More particularly, considering general principles from the viewpoint of the obligation, I can define them as absolute obligations erga omnes (obligations towards everyone: duties), so as obligations binding a subject to all the other subjects of international law.
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This definition is valid if we consider international law holistically, in the absolute sense. So conceived of general principles constitute the foundation of the international legal order, insofar as they determine its organization. From this perspective, the obligation erga omnes becomes the necessary pendant of the concept of right, jointly with whom it forms the ensemble of the absolute legal relations. 42 Thus, I speak alternatively of 'right' or 'duty', referring respectively to the active and passive position in the legal relation. In international law this correspondence is highlighted by the ILC's Project on State Responsibility; in fact, according to R. Ago, first Rapporteur on the issue, the violation of an obligation is the perfect equivalent of the infringement of someone else's subjective right.
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On this point the intersection is realized between primary and secondary norms in the Kelsenite sense; thence derives the crucial importance of the ILC's work on state responsibility in order to shed light on the structure of the obligations, especially the general ones, in international law; indeed, the Project is basically a precious synthesis of general international law. 44 The natural complement of the Project is the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which provides essential information concerning the organization of the sources and their influence on primary rules, so assuming a remarkable impact on the structure of general obligations. 45 The prescriptive notion of 'general principle' encompasses 'general principles of international law' as well as ' 
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of general norms facilitates the development of a unitary discourse, involving the two notions, nevertheless paying attention to differences. 47 International law, as an absolute system, encapsulates several relative sub-systems. Therefore the normative notion of 'general principle' can be relativized in order to define the obligation of a subject towards all (erga omnes) the other subjects of a relative international legal system. However, according to unanimous literature, I confine this expression to general international law, whereas on the relative plane it is better to speak of 'obligations erga omnes partes' or 'erga omnes contractantes'. 48 Finally, I focus on the formal structure of general principles in the realm of absolute international law, taking into account the relative plan inasmuch as it is necessary to understand the general system. My enquiry is simple: the fundamental idea is to engage in a basic formal analysis of the structure of general principles in (international) law from the prescriptive viewpoint. I just intend to investigate what light a prescriptive formal approach can shed on general principles of (international) law, which should facilitate better understanding of how general principles, as obligations erga omnes, shape the configuration of the (international) legal system. However, this equivalence is not immediately apparent and the expression 'obligation erga omnes' is more ambiguous than it seems.
From the linguistic perspective, in providing its definition of obligations erga omnes the ICJ employs the same terminology as the ILC in defining ius cogens in article 53 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. However, notwithstanding the similarity between the two definitions, a fundamental difference exists. In article 53 of the Vienna Convention the expression 'international community of States as a whole' refers to the general consent on norms cogentes from the viewpoint of the act-sources; so the perspective is that of Hartian secondary norms. Instead, the ICJ opines that the expression 'international community as a whole' concerns the form of the obligation, as confirmed by the reference to the generalized reaction in case of infringement; so the perspective is that of Kelsenite primary and secondary norms. A pattern to describe obligations erga omnes: absolute or relative, indivisible or divisible 'Obligation erga omnes' means 'obligation towards everyone': an obligation erga omnes is a general duty to behave or not to behave in a specific way.
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Thus, we can think of the obligation erga omnes as the position of a subject burdened with a number of passive relations, all having the same content in terms of behaviour, equal to the number of the other subjects that constitute a given legal order. 55 Emphasis added. Note also that article 40-bis § 1 a) proposed by J. Crawford From the perspective of the structure the obligation erga omnes can be indivisible or divisible. An indivisible obligation erga omnes links jointly a subject to all the other subjects of a given legal order: it is a unitary duty; hence I think of this obligation as an ensemble of interdependent claim-obligation relations. The indivisibility entails two corollaries. Firstly, from the vantage point of the power, the indivisible obligation is unavailable, indeed the passive subject cannot regulate it without the consent of all the persons to which he is linked by the obligation in a given legal order. Secondly, from the perspective of the responsibility, the violation of this obligation contemporaneously breaches the correlative claims of all the other subjects of the legal order.
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On the contrary, a divisible obligation erga omnes binds separately a subject towards all the other subjects of a given legal order. The divisible obligation erga omnes is a nonunitary duty, composed of an ensemble of disjointed bilateral claim-obligation relations, having the same content in terms of behaviour. The divisibility entails two corollaries. Firstly, from the viewpoint of the power, the divisible obligation erga omnes is available, which means that the passive subject can regulate it through the consent of one or some of the persons to whom he is linked. Secondly, from the vantage point of the responsibility, the violation of this obligation breaches only the correlative claim of the directly injured subject. 60 In terms of scope, the obligation erga omnes can be absolute or relative. An obligation erga omnes is absolute when it binds a passive subject to all the other subjects of a given legal order, either internal or international. 61 In domestic orders obligations erga omnes are unilaterally established by the superior power of institutions, ensuring the uniformity of law. Criminal norms are examples of absolute indivisible obligations erga omnes, whereas civil norms prohibiting physical injury are examples of absolute divisible obligations erga omnes. In the international legal system, lacking a central power, the existence of absolute obligations erga omnes, indivisible (ius cogens) or divisible, is justified through consent in the positivist theory, and through natural law in the naturalist doctrine: these obligations are the general principles of international law. 62 An obligation erga omnes is relative (obligation erga omnes contractantes) when it binds a passive subject to all the other subjects of a specific sub-system, either within internal or international law. 63 These obligations, indivisible or divisible, rise from consent, expressed by contract in domestic systems, and by relative custom and treaties 59 In the sense that the character of primary rules determines the nature of secondary rules see the Study
Group of the ILC, Report A 'common' obligation, not erga omnes, is the position of a subject linked by a sole passive relation to another subject, or by several passive relations, divisible or indivisible, to several subjects, but not to all the subjects of the general (internal or international) legal system or of a specific sub-system. These obligations, either indivisible or divisible, rise from contract in domestic orders, and from relative custom or treaties in international law.
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General principles of international law as absolute obligations erga omnes
From the passive viewpoint I think of the general principles iuris gentium as absolute obligations erga omnes. This conception is possible also for general principles of law inferred from domestic orders, considered as an autonomous category under article 38 of the ICJ Statute. 66 In the absolute sense, an obligation erga omnes is the position of a subject of international law (individual, non-state legal entity, state, international organization) linked by a bundle of passive relations to all the other subjects of the international community. All these passive relations have the same content in terms of behaviour, and thus in terms of the interest safeguarded. 67 Hence, on the general plane we can envisage the obligation erga omnes as a duty binding a subject to all the other subjects of international law.
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From the absolute perspective obligations erga omnes coincide with prescriptive general principles in international law. From the active viewpoint the absolute obligation erga omnes of a subject is matched by the correlative claims of all the other subjects of international law. These claims relate to the same behaviour imposed by the general obligation, according to the lines of the interdependence implicit in the general theory of law and highlighted in international law by the literature. 69 In a reflexive way the ensemble of the absolute claims, having the same content, held by a subject of international law towards all the other subjects, constitutes a general subjective right, matched by the obligations of all the other subjects of the international community. From the absolute perspective the rights erga omnes coincide with the general principles in international law. Thus, the ensemble of the general obligations binding all the subjects towards all the other subjects of the international legal order is matched by the ensemble of the general subjective rights 64 On the distinction between absolute and relative obligations erga omnes see H. Kelsen, held by all the subjects towards all the other subjects of international law: the overlap is complete.
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Although the proposed outlook seems coherent and complete, other interpretations of the obligation erga omnes are provided, especially with regard to indivisible obligations. According to a first opinion it would be possible to conceive of the bundle of relations that constitute a general obligation as a unique bilateral claim-obligation relation between a subject of international law and the entire community, following the model of domestic law. Hence, the international community would be the sole holder of the general claim, no subjective situation regarding the states and the other subjects.
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From the substantive viewpoint this outlook is possible, but only for indivisible general obligations, not for the divisible ones, because the unique bilateral obligation would be the result of the sum of the obligations included in the duty erga omnes, which would safeguard its universality. From the procedural viewpoint one could object that the international community lacks central organs empowered to act as a unity in international relations, making it incapable of united reaction in case of breach.
72
However, this objection does not seem decisive, because we could acknowledge that states can act as agents of the international community, in defence of the general bilateral obligation breached, so defending the unitary bilateral claim instead of exercising their own claim.
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Nevertheless, this hypothesis must be rejected because, at present, the subjectivity of the international community as such is not an unquestionable idea; in fact, the notion of 'international community' itself is highly controversial.
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Given that there is no consensus in the literature on the recognition of the legal personality of the international community as such and since international norms tend to have, as their addressees, all its members, especially states, rather than the community as one, for the time being it is better to follow a multilateral conception of the general principles, not only divisible but also indivisible.
Part of the literature assumes that the obligation erga omnes, general from the passive perspective, would entail solely simple bilateral claims, omnium, but not rights erga omnes, from the active viewpoint.
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This explanation, clear from the passive perspective, is incomplete from the active viewpoint of the relation, envisaging only the passive position of a subject towards all the other subjects of the international 70 See G. Gaja community. Hence, it does not carefully consider the strict implication between obligation and claim and, by reason of the multiplication of the number of subjects, between right and duty. It is as if light was not shed but on a part of the legal relations taken into account, leaving in the shadow another considerable portion. Considering two, several, and lastly all the passive subjects of the international system, instead of thinking of a sole passive subject as centre of attribution, we realize that the active subject has a claim not only towards one, but all the subjects of the international community.
Following another interpretation, instead of reasoning in terms of 'obligations erga omnes', it would be necessary to think of 'legal duties' at the level of primary norms.
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This is perfectly logical in passive terms, given the coincidence between obligation erga omnes and duty. Instead, the outlook of the same theory on the active position corresponding to the duty in issue is surprising, because the duty would match the claim of the subject directly injured, but only the general interest of the subjects indirectly injured. Reference is made to the 'legal interest' or 'objective interest' of all the (state) subjects to the observance of the indivisible obligations erga omnes, considering that 'third' subjects are only indirectly 'injured' or simply interested by the breach, but not injured in their subjective rights.
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With regard to 'third' subjects, a possible infringement would violate solely the duty and the interest safeguarded, which would be enough to give rise to right-duty relations from the viewpoint of the sanction; at the level of the primary rule no 'third' (state) subject would be holder of a right safeguarding the general interest, everyone acquiring a right only at the moment of the violation of a general obligation. In other words, the active situation of 'third' (state) subjects would remain 'in suspense' until the moment of the breach, when secondary rules would assume the double function of (a) determining the (state) subjects to whom the obligation is due and (b) establishing their procedural rights.
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Although ingenious, the conception of the relation erga omnes in terms of interest-obligation is incomplete and not acceptable from the active viewpoint as far as it clashes with the fundamental postulate of the necessary correspondence between right and duty, so casting shadows on the active part of the legal relation. Interests represent just the finality achieved through the behaviour imposed by the legal relation; not having formal relief, the mere 76 interest cannot justify the emergence of sanctions. In truth, when the literature speaks of 'objective' or 'legal interest', formal relief is given to the interest safeguarded, after all thinking of a subjective right.
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Therefore, from the viewpoint of secondary norms, the conditions for active participation of states in the relation of responsibility are determined by the violation of their subjective rights.
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The addressees of the general principles General principles address subjects, both from the active and the passive viewpoints.
Since the state is the core element in defining international law, a possible pattern of the international subjectivity cannot do without it. Hence, I consider as subjects of international law natural persons, non-state legal entities, states and international organizations. Given that states remain the pre-eminent subjects of international law, my reasoning especially focuses on them, but, at the same time, I try to take into account the position of the other persons of the international legal system. The basic assumption is that international subjectivity entails, at least, the possibility to be holder of legal positions on the international plane, in the active or passive way, which means that the subjects of international law are holders of rights and duties.
From the passive viewpoint, in principle, all the subjects of international law can be bound by general norms, but the applicability of a general principle depends on its content and the nature of persons.
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States and international organizations are certainly bound by general principles, cogentes and non-cogentes.
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Some general obligations, especially cogentes, as basic human rights, are becoming binding also for individuals; thus, for instance, the prohibition of genocide is a general obligation cogens imposed primarily on individuals (article 6 of the ICC Statute) and, possibly, also on other subjects, in particular the states (article 19 § 3 a) of the 1996 Project on State Responsibility). 83 The prohibition of resort to armed force binds states (article 19 § 3 a) of the 1996 Project on State Responsibility) and possibly also individuals acting on their behalf (article 5 § 1 c) of the ICC Statute). 84 Theoretically, general principles, especially 79 From the active viewpoint, all the subjects of the international legal order must be considered holders of the rights having a general scope, because the content does not influence the formal position; 86 the subjective active generality is the reflection of the objective universality of the principles. However, the content is important in order to define the specific position of every subject with respect to the general right, i.e. primary and accessory beneficiaries. Hence, we have to jettison a purely state viewpoint, because some 'extra-state' interests, set for the benefit of entities third as to states, are protected by general claims; 87 in several cases the primary beneficiaries of a general international obligation are not states, but individuals, peoples or other entities. The main examples are the right of peoples to self-determination and natural persons' human rights. In this vein, article 33 § 2 of the 2001 Project on State Responsibility provides the possibility that a state breach gives rise to rights 'which may accrue directly to any person or entity other than a State', and the ILC has specified that it is possible to identify a certain number of hypotheses where 'the primary obligation is owed to a non-State entity'.
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In these situations states hold 'accessory' claims that take part in the composition of the general obligation, safeguarding interests not only similar, but identical to those protected by primary claims, because of the correspondence between obligations and claims. It is considered that the content of a general right is identical for all its holders, regardless of the direct or indirect position in respect of the protected interest. Thus, not only natural persons, directly shielded, but also the other subjects, including states, are holders of human rights, and, besides peoples, all the other subjects are entitled to the right of self-determination. In other words, every subject of international law holds the claim in that every other subject respects the human person and self-determination. 89 Nevertheless, no real impasse exists at the substantive level, because, according to most of the authors the principle of state reaction in case of infringement does not clash with the generality of the active formal position, simply entailing that primarily states intervene in order to safeguard the rights infringed. 91 Besides, other forms of reaction are not excluded, such as the mechanisms implemented by the ICC Statute at the individual level. 92 Moreover, this pattern is perfectly conceivable in international law, which often seeks the satisfaction of extra-state interests without attributing to the beneficiaries the means directly to defend their claims. After all, given that their rights are provided with sanctions, even taken by 'third' state subjects, nonstate persons, especially individuals and peoples, are holders of general rights; it just happens that not all the holders of the general claims are enabled to adopt measures of reaction in case of breach.
système du droit international pénal -La responsabilité « pénale » des États et des autres personnes morales par rapport à celle des personnes physiques en droit international
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Indivisible general principles (obligations erga omnes cogentes)
Some norms of international law are indivisible general obligations, owed to the international community 'as a whole'. This type of relation marks the passage from the purely bilateral conception of legal international relations, exposed by D. Anzilotti, to the unitary multilateral view, defined by R. Ago. 94 From the passive viewpoint, the formal position defined by these norms is that of a subject linked to all the other subjects of international law by unitary interdependent obligations having the same content. From the active perspective, the obligation of a subject is matched by the sum of the claims of all the other subjects of international law, but not by their absolute subjective rights. Instead, the ensemble of the absolute indivisible obligations erga omnes, having the same content, linking all the subjects to another subject of international law, matches exactly the indivisible subjective right erga omnes of the latter, because the subjective right erga omnes is a bundle of joint claims of the holder 90 vis-à-vis the other subjects. 95 Consequently, the ensemble of the indivisible obligations erga omnes, having the same content, linking all the subjects to all the other subjects of international law, corresponds to the ensemble of the indivisible subjective rights erga omnes of the latter. 96 Absolute indivisible obligations erga omnes constitute the category of ius cogens. According to article 53 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the fundamental feature of ius cogens is the recognition of a non-derogable rule (i.e. of a right regulating a determined behaviour) by the collection of the states of the international community, so that a peremptory norm establishes an unavailable obligation linking a subject to all the other subjects of international law. 97 Thus, the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties defines ius cogens starting from its unavailability, not focussing on its formal structure. 98 Now, unavailability concerns the relationship between the power and the legal relation, but peremptory obligations are unavailable from the viewpoint of the power precisely because they are indivisible. Hence, the ratio of ius cogens is the indivisibility of the obligation, whereas the unavailability is the logical consequence. 99 In fact, since the obligation engages a subject in a unitary way towards all the other subjects of the international legal order, the agreement of all (state) subjects would be necessary to modify a position cogens, that is to say that the obligation cannot be altered bilaterally.
The category of ius cogens is highly controversial. In particular, the upholders of extreme relative positivism assert that it is very difficult to formulate norms cogentes, considering that custom and treaties are forms of consent, necessarily relative, and assuming that there are not superior organs capable of enjoining general rules valid for all the subjects of the international community. 101 Furthermore, the domain of ius cogens would be neither determined nor easily determinable, being very difficult to ascertain which norms fall within its domain. 102 Lastly, if the notion of 'secondary norm' is indispensable to define legal orders, it would be impossible to think of rights as absolute and peremptory for all the subjects of the international community, given that sanctions are decentralized and thoroughly uncertain: no sanction being assured in case of breach, no peremptory obligation would exist .
. 103 Radical criticism of ius cogens is not convincing. As for sources, by means of generalized practice it is possible to justify the existence of both cogentes and noncogentes general principles of international law; in fact, custom is the privileged way to introduce in the positive order fundamental ethic values protected by peremptory norms.
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Concerning sanctions, one should not reason from the perspective of practice, otherwise denying also the existence of international law, but rather from a theoretical viewpoint, where sanctions are possible for every type of breach, also for violations of ius cogens. However, most of the literature acknowledges the existence of ius cogens in the framework of the general principles of international law and viewpoints converge enough on the core rights of this category. In summary, broadly speaking, I consider cogentes: (1) The principle consuetudo est servanda (2) The principle alterum non laedere (prohibition of the use of force as source of international law of peace), entailing (3) The principle pacta sunt servanda (founding relative custom and treaties); 105 (3) The rights of states to existence, sovereignty, 106 equality, abstention from resort to armed force (in the framework of international law of peace) (4) The right of peoples to self-determination and basic human rights (in both the laws of peace and war). at 357. 105 The nature of these rules deserves further analysis. 106 The principle of sovereignty, inter alia, allows a state to pretend that the other subjects respect its autonomously established territory, but it lets the state free to regulate its territory by consent, for instance through merger or cession. 107 Opinions differ also on the relationship between ius cogens and obligations erga omnes. According to some authors, only ius cogens would be composed of absolute obligations erga omnes, because all other forms of international law would be relative, so that the domain of ius cogens would coincide with that of obligations erga omnes. 108 Another interpretation, which I share, is based on the divisibility and the availability of the obligations. Thus, the concept of ius cogens is more limited than that of absolute obligation erga omnes, because ius cogens exclusively comprises indivisible obligations erga omnes protecting fundamental interests of the international community, but also some divisible norms could be absolutely effective erga omnes. 109 Hence, among absolute obligations erga omnes some are indivisible, such as sovereignty, whereas others result from the addition of autonomous bilateral obligations, for example the duty not to interfere with the freedom of the high seas. Therefore, the image describing the relationship between the category of obligations erga omnes and that of ius cogens consists of two concentric circles: obligations erga omnes constitute a wider ensemble encompassing all peremptory norms, but not coinciding with them.
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The breach of indivisible obligations erga omnes and the procedure to invoke responsibility Given that an absolute indivisible obligation erga omnes (ius cogens) links a subject to all the other subjects of the international community in a unitary way, its breach violates the corresponding claims of all the other subjects of the international community. Article 40 § 1 of the 2001 Project explicitly refers to the breaches of peremptory norms. 113 In defining major state responsibility, article 41 of the 2000 Project temporarily adopted by the ILC's Drafting Committee relied upon the notion of 'serious breach by a State of an obligation owed to the international community as a whole and essential for the protection of its fundamental interests '. 114 In this framework, the wording employed in the 2001 Project on State Responsibility, speaking of state 'injured' and 'other than an injured State' (article 48 § 1), is somewhat problematic, because it could indicate that 'third' states are not injured by the violation. Therefore, it is better to speak of state(s) 'directly' and 'indirectly injured', in order to distinguish the position of the state especially injured by the breach and that of the other injured states.
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In fact, it is contended that the violation of an obligation cogens formally injures all the states, so that the position of every state as for the consequences of the wrongful act must be considered differently according to the nature and degree of the injury suffered, taking into account the material damage.
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For instance, in case of armed aggression the situation of the state whose territory is invaded is materially graver than that of the other members of the international community, although the violation remains collective.
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As for the responsibility of international organizations, it is necessary to follow the development of ILC's work to see the bigger picture. That said, logically the infringement of ius cogens should follow the same lines of state responsibility. On the contrary, currently there are not clearly defined rules with respect to the responsibility of non-state entities. From the viewpoint of individual responsibility, the absolute scope of the breach of peremptory norms is the underpinning of the development of international criminal law since Nuremberg and is clearly provided by the ICC Statute. Indeed, the Preamble to and article 5 § 1) of the ICC Statute speak of 'crimes of concern to the international community as a whole'. Now, given that a crime is nothing else but a particularly serious breach of a relevant obligation, it concerns the international community as a whole because it violates an absolute indivisible obligation erga omnes.
From the procedural viewpoint, in principle, the absolute and unitary conception of the breach entails that every subject can invoke the responsibility in view of the sanction; nevertheless, rules can provide different mechanisms. Hence, even the consent or acquiescence of the state directly injured does not prevent other states from judging the breach. 118 Theoretically, it is possible to presume that every state is enabled to invoke every type of sanction against the author of the violation. Reasonably, invocation by states indirectly injured seems to concern cessation and non-repetition in particular, whereas reparation for the injury caused (restitution, compensation, satisfaction) should be normally demanded by the directly injured state or, at least, the other states should make a request on its behalf. According to some literature, the bilateral obligation of the responsible state to make full reparation in favour of the directly injured state should be distinguished from the general obligation to make full reparation in favour of the international community as a whole; 121 rather, there seems to be no reason to justify this separation, because it is simply possible to think of a general obligation to make full reparation. Invocation of responsibility can also be institutionalized, specifically through consensual judicial settlement or, for instance, following the procedures provided by the UN Charter, like those based on the Security Council. 122 In this regard, some literature tells us that the right of every state to invoke the responsibility would entail the consequence that every state could resort unilaterally to international jurisdictional organs, at least in order to obtain reparation of the collective damage. 123 Normally, resort to international jurisdictional organs is a procedural question, requiring the consent of the conflicting states, except for the provision under article 9 of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. 124 Nevertheless, the fact that breaches of peremptory obligations allow invocation of the responsibility by all the community exceeds the consensual principle, as shown by article 66 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, concerning the procedure for applying or interpreting a rule cogens, which allows resort to the ICJ or the Secretary-General of the UN by any of the parties involved in a dispute concerning a peremptory rule. The literature tends also to reflect the consensus that international organizations and peoples can invoke state responsibility, when they are the primary beneficiaries of the infringed general obligation. 125 As for violations specifically against individuals, although states remain the primary holders of the right to invoke the violation and impose sanctions, natural persons can summon states through international procedures, especially into advisory organs, such as the Human Rights Committee.
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The same pattern should apply to the liability of international organizations. Individual responsibility can be claimed by every subject before domestic jurisdictions, or before international criminal jurisdictions, enabled to impose sanctions; in particular, the indivisible nature of the obligation breached gives rise to the mechanism of the universal competence. So we can think that the sanction of the breach of an indivisible general norm is also an indivisible general norm. Therefore, the duty to cease the wrongful behaviour, to offer guarantees of non-repetition, and to make reparation for the injury caused should bind a state in a unitary way towards all the other subjects of international law, who enjoy the corresponding claims. The same pattern should probably be valid also for international organizations. Regarding individuals, the duty to endure the imprisonment, to pay a fine, and to bear forfeitures, binds in a unitary way a natural person towards all the other subjects, holders of the corresponding claims to the execution.
Theoretically, the absolute and unitary conception of the sanction entails that, in case of breach, every subject can enforce it, but rules can provide different mechanisms. 129 Concerning state responsibility, every state could adopt centralized or decentralized executive counter-measures to enforce its claim, at the same time defending the common interest. The provision is controversial and leaves unsolved the question of the possibility of general counter-measures in case of violation of indivisible general norms. In particular, it is possible to understand the provision in issue in a restrictive sense, as referring to the sole measures of reprisal (unfriendly but primarily and secondarily licit behaviour), which would mean that the Project does not regulate the question of the general countermeasures (primarily illicit and secondarily licit behaviour). 134 Otherwise, the wording 'lawful measures' could relate to both the measures of reprisal and counter-measures, given that the latter are secondarily licit actions or inactions (article 22) inasmuch as they are in conformity with the procedures provided in articles 49-53. 135 The practice, still 'embryonic' according to the opinion of the ILC, tends to confirm the latter interpretation. 136 However, taking into account the criterion of proportionality, we should not be scared of the consequences in terms of counter-measures entailed by ius cogens. On the contrary, individual sanctions are executed through domestic procedures.
An alternative substantive and procedural pattern consists in thinking that the sanction of the breach of an obligation erga omnes cogens can be either an indivisible general obligation or a bilateral obligation, depending on the gravity of the violation. Thus, the unitary general sanction would entail universal reactions, whereas the relative sanction would imply bilateral reactions, especially state counter-measures.
servanda, pacta sunt servanda and alterum non laedere (probably primarily cogentes and secondarily non-cogentes, although on the basis of criteria other than the gravity of the breach) could lead to differentiate between the structure of indivisible primary obligations and that of their sanctions.
Divisible general principles (obligations erga omnes)
Some international norms are divisible general obligations, i.e. obligations erga omnes, owed towards the international community, but less rigid than norms cogentes. In the framework of Anzilotti's bilateral conception of international relations, these can be conceived of as absolute bilateral obligations. 140 From the passive viewpoint the formal position is that of a subject bound towards all the other subjects of the international legal order by obligations having the same content; nevertheless, this is not a single obligation, but rather an ensemble of bilateral separated obligations, i.e. a bundle of bilateral relations. The subject bound by the obligation owes a bundle of behaviour (conducts of the same type) to every other subject individually; although the form of the obligation is absolute, the interest protected is split. 141 From the active viewpoint the obligation erga omnes of a subject is matched by the simultaneous claims of all the other subjects of the international community. Correctly, the literature remarks that an obligation erga omnes entails the claim of all the other subjects, i.e. a claim omnium, but not necessarily the right of every one of them towards all the others, i.e. erga omnes, considering the passive position of a sole subject towards all the other subjects of the international community. 142 However, the ensemble of the divisible obligations erga omnes having the same content and binding all the subjects towards another subject of international law perfectly matches the subjective right erga omnes of the latter. Therefore, the whole divisible obligations erga omnes having the same content and binding every subject towards all the other subjects of international law perfectly match the whole divisible subjective rights erga omnes of the latter. The right erga omnes presupposes a bundle of separated claims of the holder vis-à-vis every other subject, because every relation has a bilateral structure from the active viewpoint symmetrically to the passive viewpoint. The active and passive positions are formally equal to those of the holder of an indivisible right or duty, but the claims and obligations composing the right and duty are divisible and not unitary.
Although the jurisprudence of the ICJ and part of the literature employ the wording 'obligation erga omnes' only with reference to peremptory norms, we can also use it to indicate the obligations in issue. Indeed, these obligations can be considered 'erga omnes' as far as a subject must behave in a determinate way vis-à-vis all the others in international law. 143 Being bilateral, divisible obligations erga omnes are available from the viewpoint of the power, because a subject, bilaterally bound to every other subject of the community, can regulate the obligation by consent vis-à-vis every one of them; so, this is ius generale dispositivum.
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In summary, broadly speaking, I recognize as basic divisible general obligations of international law: (1) The principle ius omnium contra omnes (founding international law of war) 145 (2) The principle pacta tertiis neque prosunt neque nocent and the effectiveness pro tertiis of rights provided by treaties so long as the contrary is not indicated (in the framework of international law of peace) (3) The principles imposing respect for states' reputation, diplomatic immunities, freedom of commerce, environment, freedom of the high seas, freedom of free airspace and freedom of Polar Regions (in the framework of international law of peace).
The breach of divisible obligations erga omnes and the procedure to invoke responsibility
The violation of a divisible obligation erga omnes is not a unitary breach against all the claims of the other subjects of the international community, but rather the violation of solely one or some of these claims.
From the procedural viewpoint, only the subject(s) directly injured by the breach is (are) enabled to invoke the responsibility in view of a sanction. Invocation of responsibility can also be institutionalized, specifically through consensual judicial settlement, or, for instance, in the framework of the WTO. However, also non-state subjects possibly injured should be enabled to invoke state responsibility; for example, the 1965 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States allows individuals' agreements with states in order to submit a dispute to a Conciliation Commission (article 28) or an Arbitral Tribunal (article 36). The pattern valid for state responsibility should apply also to the liability of international organizations, whereas the responsibility of non-state entities and individuals can be invoked by the subject directly injured following domestic procedures.
Other theoretical interpretations are proposed with respect to states, especially in the light of the wording of the 2001 ILC's Project on State Responsibility, never quoting expressly 'obligations erga omnes', maybe because of the different visions of the ILC's members on the relationship between peremptory and general norms. 147 Obviously, authors who use the expression 'obligation erga omnes' solely to identify ius cogens conclude, from the viewpoint of secondary norms, that all breaches of obligations erga omnes perpetrated by a state entail its responsibility towards all the other (state) subjects of international law, entitled to invoke the responsibility. 148 Instead, according to another part of the literature, a common regime towards the international community as a whole could apply in case of violation of both peremptory and non-peremptory obligations erga omnes. In fact, the grave breach of a cogens or non-cogens obligation erga omnes would give rise to the responsibility of a state towards all the other subjects. This interpretation assumes that some general obligations, divisible from the viewpoint of the power, so available, could be indivisible from the viewpoint of the infringement; in fact, grave breaches would 'unify' the obligation, making it indivisible and consequently violating the correlative claims of all the (state) subjects of the international community, allowed to invoke the cessation of the illicit behaviour and other sanctions.
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This view relies upon the text of article 48 § 1 b) of the 2001 Project on State Responsibility, allowing every state to invoke the responsibility if 'the obligation breached is owed to the international community as a whole', whereas article 40 simply speaks of violation of 'peremptory norms', assuming that the concept of international community 'as a whole' is wider than ius cogens. 150 Although this interpretation is interesting, it contains some problems. Firstly, the reference in article 48 § 1 b) to the 'international community as a whole' 151 could be understood as nothing else but a recall of ius cogens. Secondly, unless we see the invocation as a simple notification of the responsibility without legal effectiveness, we should think that every state has the right of imposing sanctions on the responsible state for an obligation originally divisible, which is highly problematic. 152 Thirdly, this logic, instead of focussing on the divisible or indivisible nature of the general obligation breached, seems to involve the violation of the principle alterum non laedere.
The sanction of the breach of divisible obligations erga omnes and the procedure of enforcement Breaches of divisible general obligations give rise to bilateral sanction-relations. Thus, in international law the sanction raised by the violation of a divisible general obligation is a bilateral obligation, however relative. The scheme 'If a, b ought to be' is asymmetrical because, whereas the obligation breached in a is a general principle of international law, b is a relative relation, the asymmetry being due to the divisible nature of the obligation breached.
From the viewpoint of states, the obligation to cease the wrongful behaviour, to offer assurances and guarantees of non-repetition, and to make full reparation for the injury caused binds a state only towards the directly injured subject(s). The development of the ILC's work on this matter will hopefully shed light on the position of international organizations, whose responsibility, however, should follow the principles regulating state responsibility. Concerning non-state entities, at present there are not clearly defined rules, except for domestically imposed bilateral sanctions, basically based on reparation. Also from the perspective of individuals, the domestically established obligation to make reparation for the injury caused binds a natural person only towards the subject(s) directly injured.
The relative conception of the sanction entails that, in the case of a breach, only the subject(s) directly injured can enforce it.
Concerning state responsibility, only the directly injured state(s) are allowed to apply executive counter-measures. Thus, for instance, the violation of the sanction consequent to the infringement of the freedom of the high seas gives rise to the responsibility of a state only towards the directly injured state(s), allowing its (or their) ( Still on a bilateral basis, sanctions for non-state entities as well as individuals are executed by means of domestic procedures.
Specifically from the viewpoint of states, thinking that a common regime of responsibility towards the international community as a whole would apply in case of grave violations of both peremptory and non-peremptory obligations erga omnes leads to the acknowledgement of the possible existence of an indivisible sanction and universal counter-measures also in the latter case.
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The same logic could apply identifying ius cogens and obligations erga omnes.
Brief formal conclusion on the structure of the general principles of (international) law
Assuming that the concept of obligation is the basis of legal logic, analytically speaking, a norm can formally be regarded as a right-duty (or claim-obligation) relation (1) that regulates behaviour (action/inaction) (2) among subjects (3) in definite space (4) and time (5). Hence, from the normative perspective general principles (the 'basis') of (international) law are general obligations, i.e. obligations erga omnes (owed to everyone).
Although differences exist in enjoying full personality in the international legal system, individuals, non-state legal entities, states and international organizations hold rights and duties, so they are subjects of international law.
Obligations erga omnes link a subject to every other subject of international law, endowed with a correlative claim. Although it is possible that some obligations do not concern all categories of subjects from the passive standpoint by reason of their content, the whole obligations erga omnes are matched by the whole claims erga omnes of all the subjects of international law from the active standpoint.
Because of their content obligations erga omnes can be either indivisible or divisible. An indivisible obligation erga omnes is a general unitary duty. A divisible obligation erga omnes is a general ensemble of bilateral relations. This structural feature entails fundamental consequences from the viewpoint of power at the level of primary norms, as well as from the perspective of the breach, invocation of the responsibility, sanction and its enforcement on the plane of secondary rules.
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Indivisible obligations erga omnes are unavailable from the viewpoint of the power, so cogentes, because a (state) subject cannot regulate them without the consent of all the other (state) subjects. Breaches necessarily violate all the correlative claims, possibly enabling every subject to invoke the responsibility and impose sanctions. Accordingly, sanctions should be regarded as indivisible obligations erga omnes, the violation of which allows universal enforcement, especially by means of state counter-measures. Nevertheless, in particular concerning states, specifically by reason of the gravity of the breach it is possible to split primary and secondary norms, conceiving of the sanction as 155 See IIL, Resolution on Obligations erga omnes in International Law, article 5 c), at 289; G. Gaja Divisible obligations erga omnes are available from the viewpoint of the power, so dispositivae, because a (state) subject can regulate them by bilateral consent. Breaches must be conceived of on a relative basis, enabling only the subject(s) injured to invoke the responsibility and impose sanctions. Correspondingly, sanctions should also be regarded as bilateral obligations, the infringement of which gives rise to reciprocal enforcement, especially by means of state counter-measures. Nevertheless, and particularly in the case of states, it is possible to figure out that specifically the gravity of the breach 'unifies' the primary obligation, allowing universal invocation of the responsibility; hence, the secondary obligation could be either bilateral or a general indivisible one, respectively permitting relative or absolute enforcement in the case of a breach.
